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Abstract
In the US, the bulk of CO2 abatement induced by carbon taxes comes from electric power. This paper incorporates technology detail
into the electricity sector of a computable general equilibrium model of the US economy to characterize electric power’s technological
margins of adjustment to carbon taxes and to elucidate their general equilibrium effects. Compared to the top-down production function
representation of the electricity sector, the technology-rich hybrid speciﬁcation produces less abatement at a higher welfare cost,
suggesting that bottom-up models do not necessarily generate lower costs of abatement than top-down models. This result is shown to be
sensitive to the elasticity with which technologies’ generating capacities adjust to relative prices.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C680; Q400; Q540
Keywords: Energy modeling; Climate change; Computable general equilibrium models
1. Introduction
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) analyses of the
impacts of carbon taxes on the US economy suggest that
the largest reductions of emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2)
will come from the electric power sector (Sue Wing, 2004a).
This paper incorporates electricity technology detail into a
CGE model for the US to identify the electric power
sector’s margins of technological adjustment to taxes on
CO2 emissions, and impacts of these margins on aggregate
economic variables. The simulation results demonstrate
that the malleability of capacity is an important determi-
nant of energy technological substitution and is a key
driver of the costs of policies to mitigate climate change. As
compared to the usual top-down macroeconomic repre-
sentations of sectors as smooth nested production func-
tions, the inclusion of bottom-up engineering details of
discrete technologies in those sectors responsible for the
bulk of CO2 abatement results in higher welfare losses. The
results emphasize the importance of short-run capacity
adjustment as a determinant of the macroeconomic costs of
climate policy.
Computational simulations for assessing the costs of
policies to mitigate anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse
gases (GHGs) typically fall into two categories: bottom-up
models, which simulate the interactions among the
technologies that make up the economy’s energy system,
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E-mail address: isw@bu.edu.and top-down models, which simulate the market interac-
tions among energy consumers, energy supply sectors and
other industries in the economy.
It is useful at the outset to clarify how the terms bottom-
up and top-down will be used in the paper. Bottom-up
models (e.g., MARKAL—Loulou et al., 2004) refer to
primal activity analysis simulations that solve for the levels
of capacity of energy transformation and conversion
technologies that minimize the cost of fulﬁlling demands
for energy services that are either speciﬁed according to
demand curves or derived from a simple aggregate
macroeconomic model (e.g. Manne et al., 1995). They
contain a detailed description of the energy system in the
form of a technology matrix that represents the level of
capacity of individual processes for transforming different
primary energy resources into a range of energy carriers,
and for converting these commodities into energy services
that satisfy ﬁnal demands.
Top-down models refer to macroeconomic simulations
which come in two ﬂavors: primal aggregate Ramsey
growth models with an environmental sector (e.g., DICE
and RICE—Nordhaus and Boyer, 1999), and primal–dual
CGE models (e.g., EPPA—Paltsev et al., 2005) that solve
for the set of commodity and factor prices, and the levels of
industry activity and household income that clear all
markets in the economy, given aggregate factor endow-
ments, households’ consumption technologies (speciﬁed by
their utility functions) and industries’ transformation
technologies (speciﬁed by their production functions). This
focus of this paper is on the latter category, CGE models.
Although the analytical contributions of these two
approaches are complementary, their results have tended
to diverge, with top-down models typically indicating
larger macroeconomic costs as the consequence of a given
mitigation policy (National Academy of Sciences (NAS),
1991, p. 62; Grubb et al., 1993; Wilson and Swisher, 1993;
IPCC, 1995, 2005). The origins of this divide are by now
well understood, with perhaps the biggest factor being
bottom-up models’ technological optimism about low-cost
abatement potentials.
1 Nevertheless, what remains unclear
is how, for a given degree of technological optimism, the
behavior of top-down models will tend to respond to the
inclusion of more realistic speciﬁcations of individual
energy technologies. The contribution of present paper is
to improve our understanding of this issue.
Methodologically, the paper has its roots a new class of
simulations—the so-called ‘‘hybrid’’ models—which
bridges the bottom-up/top-down divide by integrating the
detailed representation of energy technologies found in
bottom-up models into CGE models’ equilibrium structure
(Boehringer, 1998; Boehringer et al., 2003; Frei et al., 2003;
Kumbaroglu and Madlener, 2003; McFarland et al., 2004).
Like these studies, this paper focuses on electric power,
developing a hybrid CGE model of the US economy in
which the electricity sector is disaggregated into numerous
discrete generation technologies.
Unlike previous work, this paper emphasizes the
challenges which attend the introduction of a detailed
description of the technology frontier into a general
equilibrium framework, and the implications of strategies
to address them. The key issue is the so-called ‘‘ﬂip ﬂop’’
problem, whereby small changes in technologies’ unit costs
give rise to implausibly large changes in their activity levels
and market shares. Such behavior is an undesirable feature
in static models in which discrete technologies are perfect
substitutes, and in forward-looking models with an
activity-analysis representation of production in which
producers’ inter-temporal adjustments of technology-spe-
ciﬁc capital stocks are fundamentally linked to their intra-
temporal capacity utilization decisions. Mitigating this
pathology requires careful attention to the speciﬁcation of
competition among technologies on one hand, and the
adjustment process of technology-speciﬁc capital on the
other. A further issue is the numerical calibration of the
resulting bottom-up/top-down structure, which requires a
solution to the thorny problem of reconciling incommen-
surate data on the electricity sector’s demands for inputs,
statistics on the distribution of generation by technology,
and engineering estimates of the latter’s unit input
requirements.
The hybrid model serves as the test-bed for investigating
the effects of CO2 emission taxes. The simulation results
elucidate the changes in the electricity generation technol-
ogy portfolio which are likely to be induced by climate
policies, and demonstrate the consequences for aggregate
economic welfare. A second novel aspect of the paper is
that undertakes a forensic comparison of the impacts of
carbon taxes in the hybrid model and an otherwise-
identical top-down model built entirely using smooth
production functions. Doing so gives new insight into the
relative importance for climate policy costs of the
discretization of the technology set and the imperfect
malleability of technology-speciﬁc capital.
The caveat is that realistic emission reduction policies are
not analyzed. Rather than attempt to evaluate actual CO2
abatement proposals (e.g., National Commission on
Energy Policy (NCEP), 2004), the paper opts for the
simpler approach of examining the effects of stylized
policies in today’s economy, employing available statistics
as a known, constant benchmark. By contrast, analyzing
realistic policies requires the projection of baseline activity
levels for myriad electricity generation technologies over
the coming decades, which involves the additional assump-
tions and the introduction of considerable uncertainty.
These complications are avoided through the use of a static
equilibrium approach, which facilitates clearer illustration
of the character and implications of the technological
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5–10 years period.
The paper’s main result is that welfare costs of
abatement policies are higher in the hybrid model than in
the top-down model with conventional production func-
tions. This outcome can be traced to the fact that the
speciﬁcation of generation technologies as ﬁxed-coefﬁcient
activities makes the electric sector’s production function
less smooth in the hybrid model compared to its top-down
counterpart, reducing the aggregate input substitutability
on the supply side of the economy. More importantly, in
the hybrid model, the imperfect malleability of technology-
speciﬁc capital within electricity sector limits the adjust-
ment of generating capacity in the short-run, substantially
increasing the distortionary effects of emission taxes. This
last factor has received scant attention in either top-down
or bottom-up studies, and is ripe for investigation.
The remainder of the paper is divided into ﬁve sections.
Section 2 describes the general equilibrium framework
which is common to the hybrid and the top-down models.
Section 3 outlines the structure and implications of the
different ways of representing the electricity sector in each
model: a smooth nested production function in the top-
down model, and a disaggregation of the sector into
discrete generation technologies reminiscent of bottom-up
energy system detail in the hybrid model. Section 4
describes the data and parameters used to calibrate each
simulation. Section 5 reports and discusses the results of
computational experiments in which the models are used to
simulate the effects of carbon taxes at different levels.
Section 6 provides a summary and concluding remarks.
2. The structure of the CGE model
The numerical experiments in the paper require the
simulation of two models: a top-down model in which
every sector is represented by a smooth production
function, and a hybrid model in which the electric power
sector is represented by an array of discrete technologies.
This section describes the general equilibrium framework
at the core of both models.
The hybrid and the top-down model are each based on
the same static CGE simulation of the US economy.
2 The
supply side of the economy is divided into 11 industries
(denoted N and indexed by j ¼f 1;...;Ng), each of which is
modeled as representative ﬁrms that produces a single
commodity. These goods (indexed by j ¼f 1;...;NgÞ are of
two types, energy goods (coal, oil, natural gas and
electricity: e   N) and non-energy goods (m   N). House-
holds are collectively modeled as a representative agent
who is endowed with three factors of production, labor (L),
capital (K) and industry-speciﬁc natural resources (R),
indexed by f ¼f L;K;Rg. The government is modeled as a
passive entity which demands commodities and transforms
them into a government good, which in turn is demanded
by the representative agent.
The model treats the households’ aggregate capital
endowment as ﬁxed, but speciﬁes their endowments of
labor and natural resources as increasing functions of the
wage and prices of domestic output in resource-using
industries, respectively, governed by elasticities of labor
and ﬁxed-factor supply (denoted ZL and ZRj). Income from
the rental of these factors to the ﬁrms in the economy
ﬁnances the households’ use of commodities for consump-
tion and investment. The aggregate investment and
government commodities are produced according to
Cobb–Douglas transformation functions of the goods in
the economy. Aggregate investment is linked to the
aggregate rate of return on capital through an investment
demand function which maintains the economy on its
initial growth path.
The representative agent’s preferences are modeled
according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
utility function.
3 Industries generate output (y) by combin-
ing inputs of primary factors (v) and intermediate uses of
commodities (x) according to multi-level CES production
functions modeled after Bovenberg and Goulder (1996).
Their structure is shown schematically in Fig. 1, where each
node of the tree in the diagram represents the output of an
individual CES function, and the branches represent its
inputs, whose fungibility at each level of the nesting
structure is determined by the corresponding substitution
elasticities: sKLEM, sKL, sEM, sE, sM and sR.
Thus, for the non-resource sectors in panel A, output (yj)
is a CES function of a composite of labor and capital
inputs (KLj) and a composite of energy and material inputs
(EMj). KLj represents the value added by primary factors’
contribution to production, and is a CES function of inputs
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Fig. 1. The structure of production in the non-electric sectors: (A) non-
primary sectors; and (B) primary (resource) sectors.
2The general equilibrium framework is speciﬁed according to the open-
economy format of Harrison et al. (1997). The representation of
international trade has negligible inﬂuence on the results, and does not
merit further discussion.
3The numeraire in the model is the price index of ‘‘utility’’, which is the
CES composite of households’ consumption of commodities.
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intermediate inputs’ contribution to production, and is a
CES function of two further composites: Ej, which is itself
a CES function of energy inputs, xej, and Mj, which is a
CES function of non-energy material inputs, xmj.
Panel B shows the structure of production in resource-
based sectors. Because natural resource inputs play a
central role here, they are modeled as a sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed
factor which enters at the top level of the production
hierarchy. Output is thus a CES function of the resource
input, vRj, and the composite of the inputs of capital, labor,
energy and materials (KLEMj).
Proﬁt maximization by industries and utility maximiza-
tion by the representative agent result in vectors of
demands for commodities and factors, which are functions
of goods and factor prices, industries’ activity levels and
the income level of the representative agent. The CGE
model is speciﬁed in a complementarity format, in which
the general equilibrium of the economy is posed as a vector
of market clearance, zero-proﬁt and income balance
equations (Scarf, 1973; Mathiesen, 1985a,b; Rutherford,
1987).
The model’s algebraic structure results from substituting
the demand functions into these equilibrium conditions to
yield a square system of nonlinear inequalities which
deﬁnes the aggregate excess demand correspondence of the
economy (Sue Wing, 2004a). The excess demand corre-
spondence is formulated as a mixed complementarity
problem (MCP), numerically calibrated using the MPSGE
subsystem for GAMS (Rutherford, 1999; Brooke et al.,
1998), and solved using the PATH solver (Dirkse and
Ferris, 1995). Details of the model parameters and
calibration are given in Section 4 below.
3. Modeling the electricity sector: bottom-up vs. top-down
approaches
This section describes the bottom-up and top-down
representations the electric power sector which are
integrated into the general equilibrium framework of
Section 2 to yield the hybrid and the top-down models,
respectively. The top-down approach employs a smooth
nested production function similar to those employed in
Fig. 1, while the hybrid model speciﬁes the sector as an
array of discrete technologies. Comparability of the results
of the two models is maximized by ensuring that the
differences between them are conﬁned to the electric power
sector, with the remainder of the economy being speciﬁed
as in Section 2.
3.1. The top-down model
From a macro-perspective, the generation of electric
power is adequately described by production functions like
those in the previous section. However, to facilitate
accurate accounting for energy and carbon emissions,
electricity production from fossil fuels and nuclear and
renewables should be sufﬁciently resolved at the sub-sector
level that their outputs and inputs can be separately
identiﬁed. The implication of this requirement is that the
production function for electric power should reﬂect the
characteristics of both the resource-using and non-resource
using industries in Fig. 1.
Accordingly, the electricity sector in the top-down model
is speciﬁed as the amalgam of these two structures, as
illustrated in panel A of Fig. 2. Conventional fossil
electricity generation (F) is represented by the production
structure in Fig. 1A, combining labor, capital and
materials with inputs of coal, oil and natural gas. Non-
fossil generation (i.e., nuclear and renewables, NF) relies
ultimately on primary energy resources, and is represented
by the production structure in Fig. 1B, minus the inputs of
fossil fuels, and combines labor, capital and intermediate
materials with vNF, which represents a composite of non-
fossil energy resources such as uranium deposits, wind and
water ﬂows, and hydrostatic head.
Total electricity output is modeled a CES function of the
outputs of the F and NF sub-sectors. The elasticity of
substitution between yF and yNF is sF NFb1, reﬂecting the
fact that they are highly substitutable. Underlying this
structural assumption are two diametrically opposing views
of production. On one hand, electricity is a homogeneous
commodity, with a kilowatt-hour (kWh) of electricity from
fossil fuels being identical to a kWh generated from non-
fossil sources. The implication is that sF NF ¼1 . But on
the other hand, it is a fact that fossil and non-fossil
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Fig. 2. The structure of production in the electric power sector: (A) top-
down model; and (B) hybrid model, showing bottom-up technology detail.
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3850generation coexists in electricity markets while producing
at different marginal costs. This can only occur in the
presence of differentiated demands, which implies that
sF NFo1. The tension between these perspectives is even
more important in the hybrid model, as is elaborated
below.
3.2. The hybrid model: bottom-up technology detail in a top-
down framework
From a bottom-up perspective, the foregoing is a
simplistic characterization of the way in which electric
power production is actually organized. In the engineering
view, electricity output is generated from a number of
discrete technologies, each with its own distinct character-
istics. This description corresponds to the traditional
activity analysis model of production (e.g., as in Boehrin-
ger, 1998). In addition, the inputs to and the output of the
electric power industry tabulated in the macroeconomic
accounts are aggregations of the inputs to and the outputs
of three distinct and complementary activities: electricity
generation (GEN), transmission and distribution (TD), and
the overhead (OH) involved in administering the ﬁrst two
activities. TD and OH can be thought of as ancillary
activities which do not consume inputs of primary energy.
GEN is a composite of individual generation technologies,
which compete with each other on the output side to
produce the lowest-cost electricity, and on the input side
for primary factors and fuel.
In the hybrid model the production structure which is
employed to capture these features is shown in panel B of
Fig. 2. At the top level, the output of the sector is a CES
aggregation of the three activities, indexed by act ¼ {OH,
TD, GEN}. These outputs of the latter are almost
complementary, so that the elasticity of substitution among
them is low: sACT51.
4 TD and OH are modeled using
nested CES production functions which combine inputs of
labor and capital with non-energy intermediate materials
to produce their outputs.
The generation activity is the CES aggregation of a
vector of discrete generation technologies, indexed by y,
each of which produces electricity y 
y. Each technology is as
a ﬁxed-coefﬁcients (Leontief) production function of labor,
capital, and either an individual fossil fuel or the electricity
sector’s natural resource. The input of capital to each
technology, indicated by v 
K;y, can be thought of as a ﬁxed
factor which is separate from intersectorally mobile
‘‘malleable’’ capital, vK. The main consequence of the
Leontief speciﬁcation of production is that the supply
of v 
K;y determines the upper bound on the output of
technology y. Thus, the endowment of each type of
technology-speciﬁc capital is equivalent to the capacity
of the corresponding category of generation and its price
(say p 
K;y) can be interpreted as the dual capacity rent,
distinct from the rental rate on malleable capital.
An important feature of the hybrid model is its ability to
represent the kinds of capacity adjustments which electric
power producers are likely to undertake over the 5- to 10-
year-time frame that characterizes an individual period in
integrated assessment simulations. Fixed technology-spe-
ciﬁc capital endowments imply that some types of
generation may be operated below capacity, in which case
p 
K;y will tend to zero. However, if endowments can adjust,
the supply-demand balance for v 
K;y will ensure that
capacity remains fully utilized as prices change, consistent
with the assumptions of full employment and no free
disposability which underlie most CGE models. In this
situation, a decline in v 
K;y and p 
K;y represents capacity
scrapping or retirement while an increase indicates capacity
addition or retroﬁt.
The trick used to adjust the endowments of technology-
speciﬁc capital is to model v 
K;y as partially reversible, with
retirement being the transformation of existing capacity
into malleable capital, and retroﬁt being the transforma-
tion of malleable capital into additional capacity. This is
made operational through the device of a dummy
‘‘capacity transformation’’ sub-sector, speciﬁed as a con-
stant elasticity of transformation (CET) function which
demands intersectorally mobile capital and transforms it
into the various categories of technology-speciﬁc capital.
5
The critical parameter governing the malleability of
capacity is the elasticity of transformation associated with
this sub-sector, sCAP. The lower the value of this parameter
the greater the degree of ‘‘sunk-ness’’ or irreversibility in
electricity generation, in the sense that technology-speciﬁc
capital is limited in its ability to be re-allocated to more
productive uses as prices change. While there are empirical
estimates of the effects of prices on capital retirement
(Goolsbee, 1993, 1998) or the shape of industries’ adjust-
ment costs (Goolsbee and Gross, 1997), none of these can
be used to derive a value for sCAP. In the absence of
empirical evidence, this parameter is assigned a base-case
value of unity, which generates plausible results. Sensitivity
analyses are conducted to test the effect of this assumption
on the hybrid model’s response to carbon taxes at different
levels.
3.3. Challenges of hybrid modeling
The challenges in constructing the hybrid model stem
from the need to represent the static (intra-temporal) and
dynamic (inter-temporal) aspects of technology substitu-
tion.
Focusing ﬁrst on the intra-temporal dimension, the
homogeneity of electric power as a commodity belies the
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ogies employed in its generation, as was noted above. The
merit order of a base load coal or nuclear unit, a gas-ﬁred
peaking plant or a wind turbine differ substantially,
reﬂecting these technologies’ disparate availability factors
and fuel and capital costs per kWh. Moreover, they will
typically produce output for different segments of the load-
duration curve, implying that multiple types of generation
with different marginal costs are simultaneously dis-
patched.
Capturing this phenomenon is the ﬁrst major challenge
in constructing hybrid models. In Fig. 2B, modeling
technologies’ outputs as perfect substitutes (sGEN ¼1 )
results in the well-known ‘‘ﬂip-ﬂop’’ problem, whereby
small shifts in the prices of fuel or other inputs to
generation precipitate large changes in the shares of output
produced by each technology.
6 The structure of production
must therefore be speciﬁed in a way that strikes a balance
between the homogeneity of the y 
y’s on the one hand, and
their imperfect substitutability with respect to different
segments of the load-duration curve on the other. The CES
formulation is a convenient method of aggregating
technologies’ outputs because it allows their marginal
costs to differ while ensuring that their activity levels
are positive. Moreover, the CES function tends to be
stable—its homothetic, share preserving character
implies that price changes will tend not to induce
extreme deviations of technologies’ market shares from
their benchmark values, even with large elasticities of
substitution. Accordingly, large baseline value for the
generation elasticity was speciﬁed in the hybrid model
(sGEN ¼ 10) so as not to unduly constrain technology
substitution.
But the CES function is not without drawbacks. It
complicates the process of accounting for the output of the
electric power sector and downstream electricity use in
kWh, because it aggregates economic quantities in a non-
linear fashion, conserving value but not physical energy
ﬂows. Looking again at Fig. 2B, at the hybrid model’s
calibration point where all prices and activity levels set to
unity, the product of GEN’s activity level and the total
kWh of benchmark electricity generation is equal to the
sum over technologies of the products of generators’
activity levels and the benchmark kWh they produce. This
equality ceases to hold at non-benchmark prices, with the
result that the activity level GEN can no longer be
expressed as the sum of the levels of activity of its
generation inputs, a problem which is further complicated
by the aggregation of the output of GEN with the non-
energetic outputs of the OH and TD activities. The general
lesson is that in hybrid models energy accounting must be
performed at the level of individual energy supply
technologies, and the energetic coefﬁcient on the output
of the technology-rich sector varies endogenously with
changes in prices.
7
By comparison, the challenge of representing the inter-
temporal dimension of technology substitution is far
greater, as it necessitates modeling the process by which
producers adjust stocks of technology-speciﬁc capital. The
most theoretically correct speciﬁcation of capacity adjust-
ment is found in dynamic general equilibrium simulations
based on the Kuhn–Tucker conditions of the standard
Hayashi–Summers proﬁt maximization problem of a
forward-looking producer (e.g., Frei et al., 2003).
Computational implementation of such models is
fraught with difﬁculty. Data on investment in energy
supply technologies is rarely available, necessitating
strategies such as balanced growth path calibration which
force technologies’ market shares to remain constant over
models’ baseline trajectories. But the thorniest issue is how
to represent the process by which producers re-allocate
investment among technologies as prices change. Even in
full-employment dynamic models with multiple capital
stocks, the inclusion of adjustment costs may not be
adequate to prevent corner solutions in which investment is
concentrated in only in one or two technologies. Further-
more, such pathological behavior is exacerbated by the fact
that the activity analysis speciﬁcation of production makes
the Hayashi–Summers problem discontinuous, with the
result that for a given technology, the relevant equations of
motion are only active once output bumps up against the
limit of extant capacity.
8 Thus, it is likely that investment
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yyy. The energy coefﬁcient on aggregate generation
output is therefore endogenous: eGEN ¼
P
ye0
yyy=GEN, and will adjust as
prices change. Note that this problem plagues the top-down structure in
Fig. 2A as well. In the notation of that model, the kWh per dollar of
output of the electricity sector is given by eELEC ¼ð e0
FF þ e0
NFNFÞ=y.
8Using t to denote time, the key variables in the Hayashi–Summers
model are the current capacity (K 
t;y), capacity rent (PK 
t;y), investment
(I 
t;y) and gross capital return (RK 
t;y) for technology y. With full
capacity utilization, the Kuhn–Tucker conditions imply the following
equations and associated dual variables (where complementarity is
denoted by ‘‘?’’): an intertemporal market clearance condition for capital
stocks given by the standard perpetual inventory equation with d as the
depreciation rate:
K 
tþ1;y ¼ I 
t;y þð 1   dÞK 
t;y ? PK 
t;y;
intertemporal zero proﬁt condition for capital stocks given by the
standard user cost equation, in which c
K
t;y is the marginal adjustment
cost of capacity:
PK 
t;y ¼ RK 
t;y   c
K
t;y þð 1   dÞPK 
tþ1;y ? K 
t;y;
an intratemporal market clearance condition for capital input, where
the derivative in parentheses indicates the marginal productivity of
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3852will suffer from ﬂip-ﬂop behavior as well, to the detriment
of model stability.
The ad hoc speciﬁcation of capacity adjustment in
Section 3.2 seeks to circumvent these difﬁculties by
collapsing the essence of producers’ capacity adjustment
behavior into a static equilibrium framework. The basis for
the approach is the fundamental relationship between
intra-temporal capacity utilization decisions and inter-
temporal investment decisions outlined in footnote 4. The
practical implication of this linkage is that in a static
framework even if generators’ outputs are modeled as
perfect substitutes, the potential for ﬂip-ﬂop behavior is
still regulated by the ability of producers to adjust
technology-speciﬁc capital. Previous hybrid modeling
studies have largely overlooked this point.
To appreciate the importance of capacity malleability,
consider that in MARKAL-type bottom-up simulations
the levels of capacity in energy supply technologies are the
key control variable. These models treat the supply of
capacity as perfectly elastic but constrain adjustment
through the use of bounds on technologies’ maximum
rates of expansion and decline, which are tuned according
to modelers’ sense of plausibility. By contrast, both static
and dynamic hybrid CGE models tend to model technol-
ogy-speciﬁc capital as being in perfectly inelastic supply
within a given period.
Blurring the distinction between inter- and intra-
temporal adjustment is useful because elastic and inelastic
capacity supply can then be thought of as the extremes of a
continuum in which capacity exhibits varying degrees of
responsiveness to price changes. It seems reasonable to
assume that over a decadal time-period reality will lie
somewhere in the middle, with climate policies inducing
shifts in the relative marginal costs of generation to the
point where producers ﬁnd it economical to scrap and/or
retroﬁt existing capital, resulting in the retirement of
capacity in carbon-intensive technologies and capacity
expansion in carbon-free technologies. But despite recent
attempts to understand how inter-fuel substitution possi-
bilities are mediated by capacity change in energy supply
technologies (e.g., Vo ¨ gele et al., 2004), the central unknown
remains the short-run elasticity of adjustment of technol-
ogy-speciﬁc capital to changes in energy prices.
To ﬁx ideas, consider the implications of the extrema
discussed above in the short run. Treating v 
K;yas price-
invariant (i.e., sCAP ¼ 0 in Fig. 2B) requires each kind of
technology-speciﬁc capital to be speciﬁed as a factor whose
supply is ﬁxed at the levels of the representative agent’s
benchmark endowments. Because capacity is ﬁxed, utiliza-
tion rates are the sole margin of adjustment for electricity
generators. In this situation it is likely that carbon taxes
will induce drastic reductions in the utilization of coal-ﬁred
electric generation at the same time as capacity constraints
prevent the expansion of gas, nuclear or renewable
generation, resulting in high macroeconomic costs.
Conversely, if v 
K;y is treated as perfectly malleable, i.e.,
identical to general, intersectorally mobile capital, then
capacity is completely reversible (sCAP ¼1 ). In the case
where technologies’ outputs are also perfect substitutes
there will be virtually no limit on the ability of producers to
scrap capital where variable costs are high and add it where
they are low. Flip-ﬂop behavior will result.
9 If sGEN is large
but ﬁnite, small changes in energy prices induce substantial
technology substitution, signiﬁcantly moderating the
macroeconomic costs of emission reductions. The intuition
in both these cases is that producers adjust capacity
utilization until the marginal costs of generation are
equalized across technologies. CES aggregation of tech-
nologies’ outputs relaxes this assumption while having
minimal impact when the value of sCAP is small, but
preventing ﬂip-ﬂop behavior in cases where it is large.
Representing the intra- and inter-temporal aspects of
technology substitution in hybrid CGE models is not a
settled matter. Thus, while the techniques of model
construction developed here are a convenient way to avoid
many of the difﬁculties which attend hybrid modeling, they
are unlikely to be the last word on this issue.
4. Data, parameters and calibration
Both models are numerically calibrated on a social
accounting matrix (SAM) for US economy in the year
2000, using values for the substitution elasticities (which
are based on Bovenberg and Goulder, 1996) and factor
supply elasticities in Table 1. The basic SAM is constructed
from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data for 1999 on
input–output transactions and the components of GDP by
industry.
10 The resulting benchmark table was then scaled
to approximate the US economy in the year 2000 using the
growth rate of real GDP, deﬂated to year 2000 prices, and
aggregated into 11 industry groupings—ﬁve energy in-
dustries: coal, crude oil & gas mining, natural gas
distribution, petroleum reﬁning and electric power; and
six highly aggregate non-energy sectors: agriculture, energy











and zero proﬁt for investment, where c
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If the production function Fy is Leontief then the last three equations are
discontinuous, with investment occurring only in those periods when




t;y do not exist, a phenomenon which creates considerable
numerical instability. The large ﬂuctuations in capacity additions in Frei
et al (2003, Fig. 6) and Kumbaroglu and Madlener (2003, Figs. 2 and 3)
are symptomatic of the problem.
9Indeed, in preliminary runs of the hybrid model an equilibrium could
not be computed for sGEN ¼1 .
10See Sue Wing (forthcoming) for details.
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3853tion, services, and an amalgam of the remaining industries
in the economy.
The economic accounts do not record the contributions
to the various sectors of the economy of key natural
resources that are germane to the climate problem.
Following Sue Wing (2001), information from a range of
additional sources is employed to approximate these values
as shares of the input of capital to the agriculture, oil and
gas, mining, coal, and electric power, and rest-of-economy
industries. Applying these shares allows the value of
natural resource inputs to be disaggregated from the factor
supply matrix, with the value of capital being decremented
accordingly. The ﬁnal SAM, shown in Fig. 3, along with
the parameters in Table 1, speciﬁes the numerical calibra-
tion point for the top-down model.
To calibrate the hybrid model it is necessary to
disaggregate the column in the SAM which corresponds
to the electric power sector. The method used here follows
Sue Wing (forthcoming) in apportioning the entries in the
column account among the activities OH, TD and GEN,
and the latter’s constituent discrete generation technolo-
gies. The essence of the procedure is to minimize the
deviations between the benchmark allocation of inputs to
the discrete technologies and the input cost shares implied
by their engineering characteristics, subject to the zero-
proﬁt and market-clearance constraints of the bottom-up
production structure in Fig. 2B.
The hybrid model distinguishes 18 speciﬁc technologies:
two types of coal-ﬁred generation (steam turbines, ST; and
combined-cycle, CC), ﬁve categories of petroleum- and
natural gas-ﬁred generation (internal combustion engines,
IC; combustion turbines, CT; and gas turbines, GT, in
addition to ST and CC), nuclear and hydropower, and four
classes of renewables. The characteristics of these technol-
ogies are shown in Table 2. Input shares for labor, capital
and fuel in generation costs using the assumptions to the
Annual Energy Outlook (DOE/EIA, 2003a), the prices of
fuels and electricity from the Electric Power Annual (DOE/
EIA, 2003b), and additional data on capacity factors and a
variety of sources. The data on net generation are from the
EIA Utility Form 906 database.
11 This source also
tabulates data on fuel consumption by prime mover and
fuel type, which are not shown. The calibration procedure
computes the average cost of generation and the allocation
of the remainder of the electric sector’s non-energy
materials, labor and capital to TD and OH.
The resulting column disaggregation is shown in Fig. 4.
The row totals indicate the total demand for each input by
the electric power sector. By design, these values coming
out of the hybrid calibration procedure are identical to the
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Table 1







Agriculture 0.68 1.45 2.31 0.4 0.5 sKL
f 0.7
Crude oil & gas 0.68 1.45 5.00 0.4 1.0 sEM
g 0.7
Coal 0.80 1.08 1.14 0.4 2.0 sM
h 0.6
Reﬁned oil 0.74 1.04 2.21 — — sT
i 1.0
Natural gas 0.96 1.04 1.00 — — ZL
j 0.3
Electricity 0.81 0.97 1.00 0.4 0.5
Energy intensive mfg. 0.94 1.08 2.74 — — Electricity
Transportation 0.80 1.04 1.00 — — sF NF
k 10
Manufacturing 0.94 1.08 2.74 — — sGEN
l 10
Services 0.80 1.81 1.00 — — sACT
m 0.5
Rest of the economy 0.98 1.07 1.00 0.4 1.0 sCAP
n 1.0
aElasticity of substitution between value added and energy-materials composite.
bInter-fuel elasticity of substitution.
cArmington elasticity of substitution.
dElasticity of substitution between KLEM composite and natural resources.
eNatural resource supply elasticity.
fCapital-labor elasticity of substitution.
gElasticity of substitution between energy and material composites.
hElasticity of substitution among intermediate materials.
iElasticity of output transformation between domestic and exported commodity types.
jLabor supply elasticity.
kElasticity of substitution between fossil and non-fossil electric output.
lElasticity of substitution among generation technologies.
mElasticity of substitution among electric sector activities.
nElasticity of transformation for technology-speciﬁc capital.
11The total kWh of net generation in Table 2 understates total
production of electricity in the year 2000 by 21 percent. The reason is that
the present analysis excludes non-utility power producers, which primarily
belong to other sectors of the economy (see, e.g., DOE/EIA, 2003b,
Table 1.1). Since non-utility generators’ usage of primary factors and
intermediate fuel and non-fuel inputs do not appear in the electric sector’s
economic accounts and cannot be calculated from the SAM, they are
omitted from the bottom-up technology calibration procedure.
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3854corresponding entries in the electricity industry column of
the SAM in Fig. 3, implying that the general equilibrium
interactions between the electricity sector and the rest of
the economy will be similar for both the hybrid and the
top-down models. This common database ensures that
comparisons of the model’s behavior reﬂect only structural
and parametric differences, guaranteeing the given degree
of technological optimism.
To simulate the economic effects of taxes on CO2
emissions, the demands for fossil fuels by industries and the
representative agent are linked to emissions of CO2 though
aggregate emission factors. The latter assume a ﬁxed
stoichiometric relationship between the benchmark value
of aggregate demand for each fossil-fuel commodity and
the CO2 emitted from the use of that fuel in the base year.
12
The resulting coefﬁcients serve to translate the carbon tax
into a vector of ad valorem taxes on fossil fuels which
differentiated by carbon content. For each model, the
simulation experiments ﬁrst replicate the year 2000 bench-
mark equilibrium as the no-policy counterfactual, and then
compute a series of distorted equilibria with emission taxes
of $50, $100, $150 and $200 per ton of carbon.
13 The
revenue from these taxes is recycled to the representative
agent as a lump-sum transfer.
5. Results and discussion
This section presents four sets of simulation results. The
effect of carbon taxes on individual generation technolo-
gies and the electricity sector in the hybrid model is ﬁrst
introduced, and then the general equilibrium effects of the
changes in the generation portfolio are analyzed. There
follows a comparison of the behavior of the top-down and
the hybrid model, as well as a sensitivity analysis which
highlights the importance of capital malleability for the
macroeconomic costs of climate policy.
5.1. Technology dynamics in electric power generation
The ﬁrst set of results characterizes the effects of CO2
emission taxes on both individual generation technologies
and the electric power sector as a whole. The response



































































































































































































































































Coal  0.24 1.45 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.22  0.06 0.01  0.06  0.13    0.01 -0.01  0.01 0.00  -0.03 0.15  2.29
Electricity 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.28 0.12  0.17 1.38  2.35 0.28  6.45  0.46  10.21  0.00  2.70 0.00  -0.15 0.05 24.47
Gas  0.00 0.53 2.28 0.04 0.45  0.25 0.82  0.73 0.06  1.22  0.21    3.53  0.00  0.61 0.00  0.00 0.04 10.76
Agriculture  0.00 0.01 0.00 7.03 0.00  0.01 0.17 14.88 0.01  3.07  0.72    3.85 -0.09  0.31 0.00  -2.49 1.88 29.37
Crude oil 
& gas  0.00 0.02 4.80 0.00 2.68  8.38 0.94  0.02 0.03  0.06  0.04    0.00  0.07  0.01 0.00  -6.53 0.34 10.86
Refined 




0.10 0.12 0.02 1.42 0.29  0.51  17.43 29.83 0.18  6.81  9.47    7.13  0.89  2.11 0.01 -11.47 7.96 72.82
Manu-
facturing  0.34 0.35 0.05 3.16 0.18  0.19 5.51 91.16 2.28 43.48 24.57  108.95 71.89 10.67 7.44 -84.41  46.88  332.69
Transport. 0.16 0.95 0.13 0.88 0.12  0.78 3.55  7.68 9.80  8.30  2.98  14.70  1.38  2.62 0.12  -1.54 6.65 59.24
Services  0.39 2.27 0.74 4.78 3.99  2.26  10.78 49.31  11.17  240.36 25.59  500.94 40.24  5.28 5.70  0.73  20.57  925.08
Rest of the 
economy  0.02 2.51 1.11 0.40 0.52  0.35 3.51  4.97 2.60 24.81  2.69  5.95 58.87  115.31  19.01 -15.40  10.83  238.06
Labor  0.44 4.42 0.43 4.19 0.67  1.14  16.13 84.31  19.03  353.96  111.49  596.21
Capital  0.17 8.39 0.87 7.67 0.84  2.11  10.81 41.03 9.79  187.89 66.51  336.07
Resources 0.11 0.44 0.00 0.16 0.69  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.00  7.39    8.79
Taxes  0.20 2.69 0.26 0.63 0.26  0.20 0.94  5.77 1.71 47.31  1.26  61.23
Subsidies 0.00  0.00  0.00  -1.72  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  -0.13 -0.82  -17.19  -19.87
Total  2.29 24.47 10.76 29.37 10.86  18.10 72.82 332.69 59.24 925.08 238.06  661.69 173.37 141.55 32.28 -122.84 96.37 
Value added = GDP = 9.82 Trillion dollars; Gross Output = 17.24 Trillion dollars 
Fig. 3. Year 2000 social accounting matrix for the US (2000 Dollars  10
10). Value added ¼ GDP ¼ 9.82 trillion dollars; Gross output ¼ 17.24 trillion
dollars. Source: Bureau of economic analysis; author’s calculations and assumptions.
12Fossil-fuel emissions of carbon in the base year were divided by
commodity use in the SAM (calculated as gross output–net exports). CO2
emissions in the year 2000 from coal, petroleum and natural gas are 2112,
2439 and 1244MT, respectively (DOE/EIA, 2003c), while the aggregate
use of these commodities in the SAM is 21.8, 186.5 and 107.1 billion
dollars, respectively. The emission coefﬁcients for coal, petroleum and
natural gas are thus 0.097, 0.012 and 0.013 tons of CO2 per dollar,
respectively.
13A potential source of confusion in that the taxes are speciﬁed in units
of carbon while environmental statistics usually account for GHG
emissions in units of CO2. The ratio of these substances’ molecular
weights (0.273 tons of carbon per ton of CO2) establishes an equivalency
between the two measures. The corresponding taxes on carbon dioxide are
less than one-third as large as the carbon taxes in the text: $13.6, $27.3,
$40.9 and $54.5 per ton of CO2.
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3855Fig. 5.
14 The dynamics are for the most part what one
might expect, with a very large decline in the output of
coal-ﬁred generation being partially offset by a correspond-
ing increase in technologies that use other fuels with lower
carbon contents.
Electricity production by oil-ﬁred and natural gas-ﬁred
technologies expands. This increase is concentrated in base-
load conventional steam turbine technologies, which are
responsible for much of the substitution for pulverized
coal. Intermediate-load gas-ﬁred combustion turbine and
gas turbine generation both see large increases, with the
output of oil-ﬁred gas turbine units rising by a somewhat
smaller amount. Peaking technologies such as oil- or gas-
ﬁred internal combustion or combined-cycle units see
similar percentage increases to the other technologies, but
remain a sufﬁciently small share of the overall generation
portfolio that they have little impact. There is a marked
expansion in renewable generation, particularly in hydro,
geothermal and biomass technologies. The outputs of high-
cost alternative technologies such as a solar and wind
expand as well, but their impact remains negligible.
A somewhat surprising feature of Fig. 5 is that the
output of nuclear electric generation stays essentially ﬂat.
This result arises from competition at the margin between
nuclear and hydrogeneration for the electricity sector’s
generic natural resource. From the input shares in Fig. 4 it
is clear that while both technologies have similar capital
intensities, nuclear is less labor intensive and more resource
intensive. Therefore, because carbon taxes cause the price
of the electric power resource to increase dramatically
relative to the wage, as shown in Table 3, nuclear’s output
falls while hydro’s expands.
The extent to which this situation reﬂects reality is
unclear. Within the model’s simulated economy the shares
of nuclear and hydro in total net electricity generation
depend on the interaction of these technologies’ demands
for the electric power resource, vR,,y, with the elasticity of
total resource supply, ZR. As pointed out in Sue Wing
(forthcoming), there is signiﬁcant uncertainty surrounding
the true value of vR,y. Moreover, the true value of ZR, which
reﬂects the ease with which land may be re-allocated from
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Table 2
Technology characteristics in the hybrid model
Technology Cost shares Generation characteristics (year 2000)
Labor Capital Coal Oil Nat. gas Nat. res. Net gen. (10
12kWh) Avg. cost (cents/kWh)
Coal
ST
a 0.15 0.54 0.32 — — — 1.698 2.7
CC
b 0.16 0.58 0.26 — — — 0.002 2.7
Oil
IC
c 0.09 0.11 — 0.80 — — 0.001 4.0
GT
d 0.08 0.09 — 0.83 — — 0.005 4.0
ST
a 0.09 0.11 — 0.80 — — 0.062 4.3
CT
e 0.09 0.11 — 0.81 — — 0.001 4.0
CC




c 0.07 0.12 — — 0.80 — 5.1 10
 4 3.5
GT
d 0.07 0.10 — — 0.83 — 0.022 3.4
ST
a 0.08 0.13 — — 0.79 — 0.208 2.0
CT
e 0.08 0.14 — — 0.77 — 0.051 3.2
CC
b 0.08 0.23 — — 0.69 — 0.007 2.9
Nuclear and renewables
Hydro 0.24 0.56 — — — 0.19 0.706 1.1
Nuclear 0.13 0.61 — — — 0.27 0.248 4.3
Wind 0.17 0.63 — — — 0.20 7.8 10
 6 3.0
Solar 0.07 0.73 — — — 0.20 2.5 10
 7 10.1
Biomass 0.18 0.61 — — — 0.21 0.001 3.6










14The arrows on each chart indicate the axis to which a given series
corresponds.
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3856other uses in the economy to the mining of uranium, the
damming of rivers or the erection of wind turbines, is not
known, with the value given in Table 1 (0.5) being little
more than a plausible guess. Thus, while nuclear’s
constancy is an artifact of the model’s structure and
parameterization, its realism hinges on the homogeneity of
the electric sector natural resource, and the intensity of
competition among carbon-free generation technologies
for its use as an input.
15
Further insight into this phenomenon may be gained by
examining how generation costs respond to the carbon tax.
Fig. 6 shows the average costs of generation, which are
estimated by multiplying the benchmark costs in Table 2 by
the price indices of technologies’ outputs computed by the
model.
16 The response of costs is almost linear over the
range of carbon taxes considered, reﬂecting the Leontief
speciﬁcation of generation. The cost of coal-ﬁred genera-
tion increases sharply with the tax, rising by rises by 0.6
percent with each incremental dollar per ton of carbon.
The costs of oil and natural gas technologies increase both
at a slower rate of approximately 0.4 percent per
additional dollar per ton of carbon. The costs of
hydro and geothermal technologies increase at a similar
rate, but those of nuclear and biomass rise faster, at a rate
of 0.5 percent per additional dollar of tax. Nuclear’s cost
thereby remains the highest of all the conventional
generation technologies, which accounts for its lack of
expansion.
Fig. 7 shows that carbon taxes induce sizeable adjust-
ments in the capacity of the different technologies.
Increases in the capacity rent are associated with demand
for additional capacity, while decreases in the rent indicate
demand for capacity retirement. Panel A shows dramatic
declines in the rents for coal capacity and increases in the
capacity rents for all other electricity sources. The largest
increases occur in oil-ﬁred generation, followed by natural
gas, renewables and nuclear electricity. These changes are
mirrored by movements in the levels of technology speciﬁc
capital in Panel B. Coal-ﬁred technologies experience
retirement of 30–80 percent of their capacity, while natural
gas generating capacity expands by 40–100 percent, and
oil-ﬁred capacity expands by 50–135 percent. Capacity for
carbon-free electric generation expands by a modest
amount, up to 27 percent in hydro and only 5 percent in
nuclear. The response of capacity rents to the tax generally
exceeds that of capacity levels, as would be expected where
retirement and retroﬁt is very costly, with v 
K;y for each
technology being inelastically supplied.
The results differ from Boehringer (1998, Fig. 3), where
the quantities of base load coal and hydrogeneration
remain essentially constant, ﬁrst oil-ﬁred, and then at high
tax levels gas-ﬁred generation decline to zero, and there is a
partially offsetting inﬂux of wind power. There are two
reasons for this divergence: differences in the speciﬁcation
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Fig. 4. Electric power sector detail in the hybrid model SAM (2000 dollars  10
10). Source: Sue Wing (forthcoming).
15The inelastic resource supply implied by the low value of ZR reﬂects
the assumption that the expansion of technologies such as nuclear, hydro
and wind is constrained in the short run (e.g., opposition from local land-
owners). A more detailed representation of inter-technology competition
could model each non-fossil technology as having its own natural resource
and corresponding ﬁxed-factor supply elasticity. Assuming elasticity
values that are sufﬁciently large for nuclear and a sufﬁciently small for
hydro will likely result in an expansion of the former and a contraction of
the latter. However, such an approach is impracticable because of the lack
of data on differentiated primary electricity resources or the price-
responsiveness of their supplies.
16The model’s numerical calibration procedure sets the values of these
indices to unity in the counterfactual solution.
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Fig. 5. Electric power technology dynamics in the hybrid model: net generation (Trillion kWh): (A) coal, (B) oil, (C) natural gas, and (D) non-fossil.
Table 3
Effects of carbon taxes on prices (percent change from no-tax levels)
Carbon tax (2000 $/ton C) Hybrid model Top-down model
50 100 150 200 50 100 150 200
Commodity prices (gross-of-tax)
Coal 133 264 392 515 131 265 397 529
Electricity 9 16 23 28 8 12 16 19
Natural gas 18 35 53 70 17 35 53 70
Agriculture  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
Crude oil & gas  3.8  6.7  9.1  11.1  4.0  7.2  9.8  11.9
Oil 16 33 50 67 17 34 51 68
Energy intensive mfg. 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.9 1.1
Manufacturing  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.1  0.2  0.3   0.4
Transportation 0.3 0.7 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.7 1.1 1.4
Services  0.5  0.9  1.2  1.5  0.5  0.8  1.1  1.4
Rest of economy  0.4  0.7  1.0  1.2  0.4  0.6  0.9  1.0
Factor prices
Labor  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.02
Capital  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.03
Natural resources
Coal  75  91  96  97  87  96  98  99
Electricity 51 114 186 261 78 142 199 250
Agriculture  1.1  2.2  3.3  4.2  1.3  2.4  3.3  4.2
Crude oil & gas  29  47  60  68  33  53  67  75
Rest of economy  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3858of the policy shock, and difference in the supply elasticity
of technology-speciﬁc capital.
Boehringer examines the effect of an ad valorem tax on
the primary energy inputs to electricity production—not a
broad-based tax on CO2—which will have different general
equilibrium effects compared to the shocks simulated here.
More importantly, treating the endowments of technolo-
gies’ speciﬁc capital-cum-capacity as perfectly inelastic
makes capacity in his model irreversible, which explains the
lack of retirement of coal generation or expansion of
competing conventional generation which are the key
features of the present results. This result indicates the
importance of capacity malleability, whose implications
will be explored more fully below.
The consequences for the electric sector as a whole are
summarized in Fig. 8. Panel A shows that the dynamics
described above result in a decline in the overall level of net
generation of 8–25 percent, while shifting the composition
of the generation portfolio away from high-carbon fossil
fuels such as coal toward low-carbon fossil fuels such as
gas, and carbon-free sources of electricity such as hydro.
17
Carbon taxes precipitate a dramatic reduction in coal-ﬁred
generation, creating a supply gap which is ﬁlled by large
increases in natural gas and hydrogeneration. Oil-ﬁred
generation expands as well, but even at high levels of the
tax makes only a modest contribution to electric output.
Nuclear electricity generation remains ﬂat.
Panel B highlights both the change in the average cost of
electricity generation and the shift in its components.
Compared to the benchmark value of 2.5 cents per kWh, a
$200/ton carbon tax increases average generation costs by
60 percent. Coal generation, which initially makes up just
under three-ﬁfths of this total, shrinks by one-third. The
costs of oil- and gas-ﬁred technologies both expand ﬁve-
fold, from 0.1 to 0.5 and 0.2 to 1.1 cents per kWh,
respectively. Hydro and nuclear, which together made up
the second largest components of benchmark average
electricity costs, treble, rising from 0.3 to 0.8 and 0.4 to 0.9
cents per kWh, respectively.
Panels C and D illustrate how the activity levels of
overhead, transmission and distribution, generation, and
the entire electric sector respond to the tax. OH and TD are
largely unaffected, shrinking by about 1–5 percent relative
to their baseline levels. The impact on GEN is much larger,
exhibiting a decline of 14–33 percent. The overall effect is
to reduce the output of the electric sector by 6–17 percent.
These changes in quantities are mirrored by shifts in prices.










0 50 100 150 200











0 50 100 150 200
CarbonTax (2000 $/Ton Carbon) 









0 50 100 150 200
Carbon Tax (2000 $/Ton Carbon)









0 50 100 150 200
Carbon Tax (2000 $/Ton Carbon)
Hydro Nuclear Wind Solar Biomass Geothermal
(A) (B)
(C) (D)
Fig. 6. Electric power technology dynamics in the hybrid model: Average generation costs (2000Cents/kWh): (A) coal, (B) oil, (C) natural gas, and (D)
non-fossil.
17Renewable technologies such as wind and solar constitute such a small
share of total net generation that their collective contribution is not
discernable.
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3859percent, while that of generation increases by 30–100
percent, causing the domestic price of electricity to rise by
9–28 percent. The fact that the output of TD and OH are
less affected than that of GEN implies that the former
activities’ outputs are being substituted for that of the
latter.
18
5.2. General equilibrium effects of technological substitution
The second set of results demonstrates how the change in
the electricity technology portfolio interacts with the inter-
sectoral patterns of substitution induced by carbon taxes.
The effect of taxes on prices is summarized in Table 3. In
the hybrid model, shown in panel A, the main effect of the
tax is to increase the price of fossil fuel commodities. This
is particularly true for coal whose price rises by one and a
half to ﬁve times, while petroleum and natural gas prices
increase by 16–70 percent, in line with their lower carbon
contents. These changes have only small impacts on the
prices of mobile factors and the output of downstream
industries, a modest negative inﬂuence on the price of the
upstream sector crude oil and gas mining, large positive
effects on the price of electricity and natural resources in
the electric sector, and large negative impacts on the prices
of natural resources in coal and fossil-fuel mining.
19
The fossil fuel price increases induce signiﬁcant reduc-
tions in the use of these inputs by producers and house-
holds, where inter-fuel substitution facilitates reductions
primarily in the demand for coal. This is shown in Table 4.
Panels C–E show that all sectors see declines in coal use
ranging from 32 to 95 percent, while in the non-fossil-fuel
sectors, demands for both petroleum and natural gas
decline by between 10 and 43 percent, and electricity
demand shrinks by only 3–22 percent. However, consistent
with the results of the previous section, electricity’s demand
for oil and gas rises sharply, more than doubling the
sector’s use of these fuels.
Fossil-fuel price increases also have the effect of inducing
substitution away from non-energy inputs, which mitigates
both the inter-sectoral transmission of higher energy prices
and the associated reductions in the output of non-energy
sectors. As shown in panel B, reductions in output are on
the order of 14–38 percent for natural gas, 15–40 percent
for both crude oil and gas and reﬁned oil, and 43–83
percent for coal. These changes translate into much smaller
reductions in the output of non-energy sectors: between 6
and 17 percent in electric power, 1 and 4 percent in energy-
intensive industries and transportation, less than 2 percent
in other manufacturing industries and agriculture, and less
than 1 percent in the service and rest-of-economy sectors.
5.3. The effects of including technology detail: a structural
model comparison
The third set of results elucidates the origins and
consequences of the differences in the economy’s behavior
which arise from the different speciﬁcations of production
in the electricity sector. The different effects of carbon
taxes on prices can be seen by comparing panels A and B in
Table 3. The tax has similar effects on commodity prices in
both models, with the top-down model exhibiting a larger
increase in the price of coal and a larger decline in the price
of crude oil. The impacts on factor prices are somewhat
different. The top-down model sees smaller reduction in the
capital rental rate and a much smaller increase in the price
of the natural resource in the electric power sector.
Table 5 illustrates the differences between the top-down
and hybrid models’ substitution responses to the tax. The
changes in the demand for coal are similar in both models.
However, the substitution possibilities within the top-down
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Fig. 7. The evolution of generating capacity by technology in the hybrid
model: (A) capacity rent, and (B) capacity level.
18The alert reader will have noticed from Fig. 8 that the decline in the
level of activity of GEN (measured in dollars in panel C) is far larger than
that the reduction in the quantity of electricity generated by its constituent
technologies (measured in kWh in panel A). This is an example of the
problem of maintaining consistency between physical energy ﬂows and
economic quantities discussed in Section 3.3.
19This last result reﬂects the principle that the incidence of a tax falls
more heavily on immobile factors (McLure, 1971).
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3860model’s smooth production function give rise to a
signiﬁcant reduction in the demand for oil and natural
gas by the electric power sector in panels D and E. This is
in contrast to the large increases in its demands for these
lower-carbon alternatives in Table 4, which is the direct
result of the hybrid model’s inclusion of speciﬁc technol-
ogies. Panel F shows that general equilibrium effects in the
markets for electricity give rise to smaller reductions in
demand in non-energy sectors in the top-down model.
20
The consequences, shown in panel B, are a smaller decline
in aggregate electricity use coupled with a larger reduction
in the aggregate demand for services. Panel A shows that,
ultimately, consumption of agricultural and manufacturing
output decline by a larger amount, while the consumption
of services and the rest-of-economy good exhibit smaller
increases.
21
The aggregate implications of these detailed results are
summarized in Fig. 9. Panels A and B show that the two
models’ proﬁles of aggregate primary energy use in
response to the carbon tax are very similar. However, in
the hybrid model there is less of a decline in total primary
energy use, with slightly smaller reductions in the use of
fossil fuels and a much smaller expansion in primary
electricity generation. The respective quantities of CO2
abatement at each tax level are shown in panel C, which
plots the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curves for the
electric power sector and for the aggregate of other
industries and the household sector. The loci of the
equilibria of the hybrid model lie to the left those of the
top-down model, indicating that the tax induces a larger
quantity of abatement in the latter. The reductions in CO2
emitted by the electricity sector in the hybrid model are
some 200–450 million tons smaller than that in the top-
down model. The biggest differences occur at low levels of
the tax.
It is also noteworthy that the difference in abatement by
the remainder of the economy is small (35–65MT), which
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Fig. 8. The impact of carbon taxes on the hybrid model’s electric power sector: (A) net generation by fue; (B) components of average cost of net
generation; (C) electric sector activities; and (D) activity prices.
20In the bottom-up model the agriculture sector’s use of electricity
declines slightly, whereas in the top-down model it exhibits a small
increase.
21Consumption of the rest-of-economy good declines in the top-down
model and increases in the bottom-up model.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3863predominate and that general equilibrium effects have only
a modest inﬂuence on aggregate abatement. This suggests
that the two models’ common structure and parameteriza-
tion outside of the electricity sector give rise to very similar
behavior there, with the result that the differences in the
model simulations are attributable to their top-down and
bottom-up representations of electric power production.
The consequences for the macroeconomic costs of CO2
emission limits are shown in panel D. The graph shows the
difference in the aggregate responses of the two models to
the tax, in terms of both the percentage abatement from
counterfactual CO2 emissions and the reductions in GDP
and the value of consumption (equivalent variation)
precipitated by these cuts. In the top-down model, a
$200/ton carbon tax reduces emissions by almost 60
percent below the no-tax level, reduces GDP by 1.1
percent, and incurs a welfare loss of 0.7 percent of the
total value of consumption. By comparison, in the hybrid
model aggregate abatement as a percentage of baseline
emissions is some 5 points less, with both GDP and
equivalent variation exhibiting more elastic responses that
result in larger welfare losses. But although GDP losses in
the hybrid model uniformly exceed those of its top-down
counterpart, for carbon taxes of less than $50/ton the
hybrid model generates abatement at a lower welfare cost.
The origin of these differences in model behavior can be
traced back to the detailed results. Comparing the two
models’ ﬁnal consumption vectors in panel A of Tables 4
and 5, at low levels of the tax the hybrid model makes
smaller reductions in the consumption of agriculture and
manufacturing output, while at high levels of the tax it
experiences larger reductions in the consumption the
rest-of-economy good, whose larger share of benchmark
demand in Fig. 3 indicates its greater inﬂuence on
equivalent variation.
From a structural standpoint, the key driver of the
foregoing results is the Leontief speciﬁcation of technologies
in the hybrid model, which forces a complementary
relationship between fuel and technology-speciﬁc capital
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Fig. 9. Differences between the top-down and the hybrid model: energy use, CO2 abatement and macroeconomic costs: (A) primary energy use (top-down
model); (B) primary energy use (hybrid model); (C) marginal abatement cost curves; and (D) GDP and welfare losses.
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 3864nested production structure admits inter-fuel substitution—
implicitly treating different generation technologies that use
the same fuel as perfectly fungible, and, crucially, substitu-
tion between fuels and inter-sectorally mobile capital. The
latter in particular enables the economy to respond more
elastically to the tax, and results in lower welfare costs.
5.4. Sensitivity analysis: the importance of capacity
malleability
The fourth set of results establishes the sensitivity of the
results of the last section to the malleability of the
capacities of the different generating technologies. A key
issue is the possibility that top-down and bottom-up
simulations may both be underestimating the macroeco-
nomic costs of climate policy. Top-down models tend to
treat capital as malleable and inter-sectorally mobile, while
bottom-up models treat capacity as being in perfectly
elastic supply. By comparison, the hybrid model’s con-
straints on the reversibility of capacity in key energy-supply
technologies gives rise to the kind of short-run increases in
policy costs documented by Jacoby and Sue Wing (1999).
This last section explores the importance of these effects
by focusing on the key role played by the elasticity of
transformation between malleable and technology-speciﬁc
capital. The price-responsiveness of capacity is governed
the parameter sCAP, accordingly the sensitivity test
involves doubling and halving the value of sCAP relative
to its benchmark ﬁgure of unity, and examining the effects
on the hybrid model of different levels of the carbon tax.
Table 6 summarizes the consequences for capacity rents
and the levels of technology-speciﬁc capital, which follow
the broad pattern in Fig. 7 with both v 
K;y and p 
K;y declining
in coal generation but increasing in other technologies.
22 In
all cases, the higher the value of sCAP the smaller the
change in the capacity rent, and the larger the change in the
capacity level occasioned by a carbon tax. At the low value
of sCAP the retirement of old capacity and the addition of
new capacity are both inelastic with respect to the capacity
rent, at the baseline value of sCAP retirement is elastic and
addition remains inelastic, while at the high value of sCAP
both addition and retirement are elastic.
The effects of these adjustments on aggregate emissions
and welfare are shown in Fig. 10. In panel A, doubling
(halving) the value of sCAP causes an outward (inward)
shift of the electric sector MAC curve of as much as 50MT
of CO2. The change in emissions associated with the
retirement of coal generating capacity seen in Fig. 7 is
primarily responsible for this effect, which is largest at low
levels of the carbon tax but diminishes at higher tax rates.
The fact that technologies’ outputs of electricity are near-
perfect substitutes isolates these changes, preventing them
from inﬂuencing the MAC curves of other industries in the
model. The largest impacts of capacity adjustments are
therefore on the quantities of fossil fuels used in electricity
generation, and the abatement supplied by the electricity
sector at each level of the carbon tax.
Panel B illustrates the corresponding changes in equiva-
lent variation. The decline in abatement with smaller values
of sCAP results in larger emission fee payments by the
electric sector. But the concomitant increase in the
representative agent’s income fails to compensate for
the additional distortionary effects of the tax that result
from reduced substitutability on the supply side of the
economy. Doubling (halving) the value of sCAP thus
attenuates (ampliﬁes) the welfare losses in the base case
by 2–5 percent. Although the magnitude of this impact is
not dramatic, it is nonetheless sufﬁcient to shift the hybrid
model’s welfare losses into the range of those of the top-
down model. The fact that that these changes are solely the
result of altering the value of sCAP is testament to the
importance of this parameter.
In light of these ﬁndings it is natural to ask whether
making technology-speciﬁc capital fully malleable would
make the top-down and the hybrid models exhibit identical
responses to a carbon tax. It turns out that the answer to this
question is no. Panel A shows that even with perfectly elastic
capacity adjustment—which I approximate by making the
elasticity of capacity transformation very large
(sCAP ¼ 10)—the hybrid model still emits more CO2 than
its top-down counterpart, with variations in sCAP account-
ing for 50–65 percent of the difference in the electric sector’s
abatement between the two models. The remainder of the
abatement gap is accounted for by the differences in inter-
fuel substitution which result from the models’ dissimilar
production structures. Put another way, the discretization of
the hybrid model’s production function is responsible for
35–50 percent of the gap between its response and the top-
down model’s response to carbon taxes. Moreover, panel B
indicates that the hybrid model with highly elastic capacity
adjustment produces abatement at a much lower welfare
cost, mainly because of the low costs of capacity retirement
in coal and capacity expansion in gas.
23
To verify the robustness of these ﬁndings, a ﬁnal
experiment was conducted to examine their sensitivity to
the fungibility of technologies’ output, by changing the
elasticity of substitution sGEN. The results, which are
shown in panels C and D of Fig. 10, indicate that the lower
the substitutability of technologies’ outputs, the smaller the
changes in abatement and capacity induced by carbon
taxes. Relative to panel A, halving the value of sGEN
reduces the quantity of the electric sector’s abatement by
ARTICLE IN PRESS
22The exception is nuclear power, whose high unit cost relative to other
fossil and carbon-free generation technologies results in a small decreases
in capacity with high values of sCAP. The model chooses to re-allocate
some of the electric sector ﬁxed-factor from nuclear generation to other
carbon-free technologies with lower unit costs of production, principally
hydro.
23When sCAP ¼ 10, both the exit of coal capacity and the addition of
capacity in lower-carbon fuels occur at what would seem to be implausibly
high rates. For example, a $200 carbon tax induces a decline in steam coal
generation of 70 percent and an increase in combined-cycle gas generation
of 134 percent!
I. Sue Wing / Energy Policy 34 (2006) 3847–3869 386550–100MT and attenuates the effect of sCAP on the
position of its MAC curve.
24 When sGEN ¼ 5, variations in
sCAP only account for 25–30 percent of the gap between
the quantities of abatement by electric power in the two
models. The implication is that the greater the differentia-
tion of technologies in terms of their ability to supply
different categories of load, the less important capacity
malleability becomes.
However, panel B shows that diminished inter-technol-
ogy substitution does not cause an appreciable shift in the
positions of the loci of welfare losses. Thus, although
discretizing the top-down model’s smooth production
function for electric power reduces the aggregate substitut-
ability of the model’s supply side, which decreases the
quantity of aggregate abatement, the result is only a small
effect on the aggregate cost of reducing emissions. The
implication is that response of the latter to the carbon tax is
dominated by the elasticity of capacity adjustment, which
is unsurprising, since the lower the value of sCAP the more
the endowments of technology-speciﬁc capacity take on the
character of ﬁxed factors. This ﬁnding conﬁrms the crucial
role played by the short-run capacity malleability in
determining the macroeconomic costs of climate policies.
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Table 6
Sensitivity of primal and dual capacity variables to malleability assumptions (sCAP)
sCAP ¼ 1.0 sCAP ¼ 0.5 sCAP ¼ 2.0
$100/TC $200/TC $100/TC $200/TC $100/TC $200/TC
(A) Capacity rent (percent change from no-tax baseline)
Coal ST  41  74  54  89  31  58
Coal CC  21  47  30  57  16  37
Gas IC 115 167 131 237 74 89
Gas GT 121 174 141 255 76 89
Gas ST 110 162 124 225 73 89
Gas CT 107 159 120 218 72 90
Gas CC 87 133 92 169 64 85
Oil IC 133 196 156 282 84 104
Oil GT 142 205 170 306 86 103
Oil ST 133 196 155 280 84 104
Oil CT 135 198 159 287 85 104
Oil CC 113 168 127 229 76 96
Hydro 46 64 71 95 30 41
Nuclear 32 33 63 67 15 15
Wind 41 55 64 83 26 35
Solar 36 48 55 72 23 31
Biomass 40 53 65 83 25 33
Geothermal 45 61 71 93 28 38
(B) Capacity level (percent change from no-tax baseline)
Coal ST  53  80  43  71  64  87
Coal CC  38  59  30  44  47  71
Gas IC 69 110 27 57 126 160
Gas GT 74 115 30 61 130 159
Gas ST 66 106 25 55 123 160
Gas CT 63 104 24 53 121 161
Gas CC 47 84 16 41 100 150
Oil IC 84 133 34 67 153 202
Oil GT 91 141 37 73 159 200
Oil ST 84 133 33 67 153 202
Oil CT 85 135 34 68 154 201
Oil CC 68 111 26 55 131 178
Hydro 15 29 9 20 26 45
Nuclear 4 5 7 11  2  5
Wind 11 22 7 16 18 33
Solar 7 17 4 12 13 26
Biomass 11 21 7 16 16 28
Geothermal 15 27 9 19 23 39
24When sGEN ¼ 10, varying sCAP from 0.5 to 2 changes the electricity
sector’s abatement response to a $100/ton tax by198MT (from 580 to
778MT), and that from a $200/ton tax by 119MT (from 942 to
1061MT).When sGEN ¼ 5, the same variation in sCAP induces changes
in abatement for the corresponding tax levels of 131MT (from 547 to
678MT) and 93MT (from 862 to 955MT), respectively. The shift in the
MAC curve for the remainder of the economy is negligible.
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It is predicted that the bulk of the reduction in the US
economy’s CO2 emissions in response to carbon taxes will
come from electric power. This paper has characterized the
effects of carbon taxes on electric generation technologies
and the US electricity sector, comparing the general
equilibrium effects of carbon taxes in two CGE models
that differ only in terms of their representations of the
production of electric power.
The results show that, for a given degree of optimism
regarding the substitution possibilities in electricity pro-
duction, the welfare costs of emission taxes in a hybrid
model with a technologically rich description of the electric
power sector generally exceed those in a top-down model in
which the sector is represented by a smooth production
function. Nevertheless, for modest abatement of 10–20
percent from baseline emission levels, and corresponding
carbon taxes of less than $50 per ton, welfare losses still
appear to be smaller in the hybrid model than in the top-
down model. Thus the main ﬁndings of the paper are most
relevant for emission reduction policies that are signiﬁ-
cantly more stringent than those currently under consid-
eration (e.g., NCEP, 2004).
This behavior was shown to emanate from the dis-
cretization of the hybrid model’s electric sector production
function on one hand, which reduces the aggregate input
substitutability on the supply side of the economy, and the
imperfect malleability of technology-speciﬁc capital on the
other hand, which limits the adjustment of generating
capacity in the short-run. While macroeconomic costs are
affected by the substitutability of electricity generation
technologies in their ability to supply different categories of
load, it appears that the crucial factor is the ease with
which existing capacity in relatively high-cost technologies
may be retired or with which new capacity in relatively low-
cost technologies can be added in the short run.
The results are qualitatively similar to those of Jacoby
and Sue Wing (1999), using a CGE model with a very
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Fig. 10. Sensitivity of the hybrid model to values of sCAP: (A) marginal abatement cost curves (sGEN ¼ 10); (B) welfare losses (sGEN ¼ 10); (C) marginal
abatement cost curves (sGEN ¼ 5); and (D) welfare losses (sGEN ¼ 5).
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about the determinants of capital malleability, particularly
as it pertains to short-run irreversibility and capacity
adjustment in large-scale energy supply technologies, and
how the adjustment process should be represented in CGE
models. The all-important elasticity of capacity adjust-
ment, the device used to parameterize the ease of retroﬁt or
retirement of technologies in the short run, is thus little
more than a measure of our ignorance.
In this respect the paper provokes several questions.
From an empirical perspective, what are the determinants
of capacity retirement and retroﬁt decisions in the electric
power sector, and how responsive are these to energy price
shocks? Given that carbon taxes are likely to be announced
many years in advance of their entry into force, how might
these responses differ in an inter-temporal setting where
producers are able to anticipate price increases? Ultimately,
these elements need to be combined in a framework which
can be used to estimate the elasticity of capacity
transformation. From a modeling perspective, how does
the present method of simulating capacity adjustment
compare with other ways of representing such short-run
frictions such as the ‘‘vintaging’’ approach of Jacoby and
Sue Wing, and how might these practicable but ad hoc
approaches be brought closer into line with the theoreti-
cally correct but more complicated Hayashi–Summers
adjustment-cost framework? And ﬁnally, what do these
different approaches imply for the dynamics of penetration
and exit of energy supply technologies, and ultimately the
long-run costs of climate change mitigation?
Hopefully, the contribution of this paper will be to
encourage more researchers to explore these vitally
important issues.
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